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Abstract 
The present study examined whether institutional esteem contributes to how readers were 
persuaded by presented research information. It was hypothesized that the prestigious reputation 
of an institution may cause readers to process the presented information less thoroughly, and that 
they would use the institution as a heuristic cue when forming an attitude towards the presented 
topic. In Study 1, 267 participants on Amazon’s MTurk read an argument in favor of junk food 
taxation that varied based on the esteem (high, low) of the institution that conducted the research 
and on the strength of the argument (strong, weak). Results indicated a main effect of argument 
strength, such that individuals who read strong arguments had more favorable attitudes toward 
junk food taxation than those who read weak arguments; however, there was no main effect of 
institutional esteem on junk food taxation attitudes. In Study 2, 213 introductory psychology 
students followed the same protocol as Study 1 with an additional manipulation of cognitive load 
(high, low, none) while reading the junk food taxation argument. Results of Study 2 indicated no 
effect of institutional esteem, argument strength, or cognitive load on attitudes toward junk food 
taxation. Implications for the understanding of how institutional esteem may affects attitudes are 
discussed. 
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 Researchers suggest that many individuals tend to be “cognitive misers” (Moss & 
DiCaccavo, 2005), meaning that they are likely to not think about things more than they have to. 
Because individuals tend do not process all of the information that is presented to them 
throughout the day, they tend to rely on heuristics to make decisions and form attitudes towards a 
topic. Heuristics can be described as easily applied decision making techniques that are based on 
prior experiences, but do not always use all available information to the individual making the 
decision (Katsikopoulos, 2011). For example, one study found that when given a choice of two 
products, individuals often chose the familiar product –even when provided with additional 
information suggesting it was of lower quality (Thoma & Williams, 2013). The results of this 
study indicate that individuals may use mental shortcuts (heuristics) to aid perception of product 
quality.  
In a similar way, individuals may use the esteem of an institution as a heuristic when 
making decisions regarding the research that comes from the institution. For example, a study 
conducted in England found that the more prestigious institutions benefited from a publication 
bias, and that there may have been a kind of “halo effect” that made their research appear to be 
of higher quality (Taylor, 2011). The present study aimed to examine whether the strength of an 
argument might be overlooked if the person reading it was processing the information 
peripherally. Specifically, if the individual is processing peripherally, would they overlook a 
weak argument and rely on the esteem of the institution from which the argument came to form 
their attitude towards the topic of the argument? 
Information Processing – The Elaboration Likelihood Model 
 To assess how closely the participants were processing information that was presented to 
them in an argument, the present study took an information processing approach. Several dual 
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process models of information processing exist and provide frameworks for understanding the 
manner in which people process information, forms of influence, and the persuasion process 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1984; Chaiken & Eagly1989). One dual process model is the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM; Cacioppo & Petty, 1984). According to the ELM, there are two routes 
through which attitude change can occur: the central route and the peripheral route (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). The central route of processing information requires cognitive effort; 
processing in such a way leads to an individual attending to information contained in an 
argument in an elaborative way that taxes an individual’s cognitive resources. Processing 
information in this way helps an individual come to an informed opinion, or a well-founded 
attitude, on a topic. Also, the attitude will likely be long-lasting and resistant to change 
(Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986). Individuals are likely to take the central route when 
they are motivated and able to attend to information presented in an argument (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1984). However, if the individual is unwilling or unable to elaborate on the presented 
information, then they are more likely to take the peripheral route, relying more on peripheral 
cues (such as authority of the source of the argument or the length of the argument) within the 
information and heuristics in information processing and decision making (Cacioppo et al., 
1986). The peripheral route of processing is a way of information processing in which 
individuals are more likely to use shortcuts, such as heuristics, to form opinions and come to 
conclusions. Such processing leads an individual to an opinion or attitude on a topic that is 
transient and susceptible to future persuasion. As previously stated, it is possible that the esteem 
of an institution named in an argument may serve as a peripheral cue to an individual that is not 
processing centrally. The esteem of the institution, not the argument itself, may serve as a 
heuristic that is the basis of the individual’s formed attitude. 
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 Many studies have found different scenarios in which one route of processing may occur 
over the other, in turn affecting how likely individuals were to rely on heuristics. For example, 
one study utilizing the ELM to examine the effects of consumer skepticism found that highly 
skeptical consumers were more likely to rely on their intrinsic beliefs instead of situational 
factors – taking the more central route to processing when shopping online – whereas consumers 
with low skepticism were more likely to take the peripheral route – relying on peripheral cues 
such as review quality when forming an attitude toward a product (Sher & Lee, 2009). It is 
possible an argument from a highly esteemed institution may result in someone being less 
skeptical of the argument itself, and that preconceived notions of where information is coming 
from could affect attitudes toward more than just consumable goods. One study conducted to 
evaluate the effectiveness of Research Assessment Exercise panels–panels tasked with 
evaluating the quality of research being produced by British higher education institutions–found 
that they tended to be biased toward more prestigious institutions (Taylor, 2011). Although the 
study did not evaluate whether or not the review panels were processing in a peripheral fashion, 
it is possible that peripheral processing could serve as a proxy for such a bias. By controlling the 
processing route taken by participants, it may be possible to manipulate the frequency with 
which they use heuristic cues–such as the name of the sponsoring institution–to evaluate research 
or argument quality. It is expected that use of the peripheral route will result in an increase of the 
use of such heuristics.  
There are situations in which heuristics can be used reliably to make quick decisions. For 
example, heuristics are commonly used in situations in which there may be little information 
about a topic, a non-linear decision environment, or when the cognitive abilities of the decision 
maker are taxed (Katsikopoulos, 2011). However, some researchers suggest that without 
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adequate experience to draw from, subjects tend to rely more heavily on heuristics that may bias 
perceptions (Ganzach, 2009). In other words, previous knowledge and preconceived beliefs can 
form future beliefs and guide future decisions, and those beliefs and decisions are not always 
best adapted to the situation in which they are being applied. One study found that with depleted 
cognitive resources (restriction of the letters that participants were allowed to respond with), 
participants were more likely to use a recognition heuristic when asked to determine which of 
two presented cities had a larger population (Pohl, Erdfelder, Hilbig, Liebke, & Stahlberg, 2013). 
The results of this study indicate that individuals are more likely to use heuristics when they have 
limited cognitive resources. Applied to the current study, when the cognitive resources of an 
individual are depleted, it is more likely that the individual will use the institution’s name, or 
their perception of the institution’s esteem, as a heuristic for judging the persuasive quality of an 
argument. 
 Although people are motivated to hold correct attitudes, there a number of reasons that 
the peripheral route might be taken instead of the central route, resulting in less elaboration and 
an increased chance of holding an incorrect attitude towards a topic or issue (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1984). Situations that may result in an individual taking the peripheral route could include, but 
are not limited to, little time allotted for processing, low issue relevance (the participant does not 
feel that the persuasive message is impactful on a personal level), and low cognitive capacity 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1984).  
 It is possible that these differences in information processing affect decision making 
based on persuasive messages in different situations. One study asked participants to look at a 
fabricated page of job advertisements and pick the six that they would most likely apply to 
(Jones, Shultz, & Chapman, 2006). Those who were more motivated (given a cash incentive) and 
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capable of elaboration (more time allowed to read all ads) tended to select advertisements that 
had relevant information about the job (e.g., paying higher wages, being in a field of interest). 
Conversely, those who were not told that there would be a cash incentive and/or were not 
allowed enough time to read each advertisement were more likely to take the peripheral route, 
relying on peripheral cues pertaining, for example, to how attractive the advertisement looked 
(Jones et al., 2006). The results of these studies suggest that experimenters can create situations 
in which participants are more likely to take a particular processing route to persuasion. The 
present study aims to employ the same type of manipulations, making it more likely that 
participants will process information peripherally leading to the use of institutional esteem as a 
peripheral cue.  
Argument Strength 
 Argument strength has been used as another means of producing attitude change. A 
strong argument can be defined as one containing statements that, when participants are 
instructed to think about them, they tend to result in favorable attitudes towards the topic. 
However, a weak argument would be one containing statements that when participants are 
instructed to think about them, they tend to result in thoughts and attitudes that are unfavorable 
towards the topic (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). One previous study used argument quality to 
manipulate the formation of attitudes toward information technologies (IT), finding that stronger 
arguments resulted in more positive attitudes toward the use of IT (Lee, 2012). Another study 
found that when participants read an argument for junk food taxation that was counter to their 
attitudes, stronger arguments led to more favorable attitudes toward the topic (Clark, Wegener, & 
Fabrigar, 2008). By manipulating argument strength, the present study seeks to assess whether 
institutional esteem affects the way in which participants process information. Specifically, if 
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institutional esteem is high, participants may use the esteem of the institution named in the 
argument as a way of quickly forming their attitude regardless of the argument strength. It is 
likely that this peripheral cue would be trumped by argument strength if the information is 
processed centrally. If participants process the arguments in the current study peripherally, 
argument strength should not matter. That is, when the participants are processing peripherally 
they should have more positive attitudes when they read an argument from a high esteem 
institution than a low esteem institution. However, if participants instead process the arguments 
centrally, the strength of the argument should relate to the magnitude of attitudes.   
Institutional Esteem and Implicit Biases 
 Implicit biases are biases that are unintended: something a person is unaware of holding, 
but by which they are still affected (Cooley, Payne, & Phillips, 2014). For example, one study 
utilizing the implicit association test (IAT; a measure of implicit bias) found that undergraduate 
students majoring in nursing and psychology expressed an implicit bias towards overweight 
individuals (Waller, Lampman & Lupfer-Johnson, 2012). The students in the study had trouble 
associating positive attributes to images of overweight individuals, and they also had difficulties 
ascribing negative attributes to images of normal-weight individuals. A similar study found an 
unconscious bias against race and gender when evaluating letters of recommendation (Morgan, 
Elder, & King, 2013). Specifically, individuals with African American sounding names were 
rated significantly less likely to achieve overall success in the graduate program of the 
participant’s field than individuals with Caucasian sounding names, and female applicants were 
rated significantly higher than male applicants (after controlling for the effects of race). It is 
likely that students in these studies were making decisions guided by implicit biases based on 
weight (Waller et al., 2012) and race and gender (Morgan et al., 2013). A previous meta-analysis 
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indicated that when less information is provided regarding applicant characteristics, male 
applicants were rated more favorably than female applicants (Swim, Borgida, & Maruyama, 
1989). In a recent study, when science faculty at Yale University were presented with 
applications for a lab manager position, they were more likely to choose male students for the 
job, even though the applications from the male and female students were identical except for the 
applicant’s name (Dovidio, Moss-Racusin, Brescoll, Graham, & Handelsman, 2012). Although 
individuals in academia may be highly educated and aware of their decisions and mindsets, they 
are not impervious to implicit biases. If this bias can occur in academia, it is also likely that such 
an implicit bias could develop in the general public, in turn affecting attitude formation.  
 Evidence for a bias in the perception of academic research quality exists (Taylor, 2011). 
It is reasonable to think that individuals who are at all familiar with an academic institution will 
have a formed opinion of it. These opinions may be shaped by common beliefs and views in 
today’s cultures, beliefs that may lead individuals to see research and findings from institutions 
that they view to be more prestigious as infallible. Conversely, they may also view institutions 
that they perceive as less prestigious, as being less trustworthy, in turn biasing their perception of 
research coming from such institutions as less trustworthy and persuasive.   
 Although not directly related to institutional esteem, a recent study examined 
participants’ ability to detect erroneous information in a research summary. Eriksson (2012) 
asked participants to read one of two abstracts, one from anthropology and one from sociology, 
in which the abstract was presented as-published (no manipulation) or with the addition of both 
an erroneous sentence and a “nonsense” mathematical equation. Results indicated that 
participants rated the abstracts containing the mathematical equation as of higher quality than 
those without the equation, even though this equation made no sense given the rest of the 
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abstract. The results of this study also point towards the potential for individuals to “miss” 
information that could show flaws in a research study; however, it is unclear if they were 
processing the information in this study centrally or peripherally.  
The Present Studies 
 The present studies sought to ascertain whether or not institutional esteem has an effect 
on the formation of attitudes towards a topic. It is possible that institutional esteem plays 
differing roles in attitude formation based on whether the evaluator is processing through the 
peripheral or central route. In the first study, argument strength and institutional esteem were 
manipulated to assess their influences on attitude formation. In the second study, cognitive load 
was also manipulated to assess whether this factor altered processing route. For Study 1, it was 
hypothesized that institutional esteem  will play a role in the formation of the participants’ 
attitudes towards junk food taxation. Specifically, high esteem institutions will result in more 
positive attitudes towards junk food taxation than low esteem institutions. It was also 
hypothesized that those who read a strong argument in favor of junk food taxation will have 
more positive post-manipulation attitudes towards junk food taxation than those who read a weak 
argument. It was hypothesized that there would be an interaction effect. Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that when an argument is weak, high esteem institutions will result in more positive 
attitudes towards junk food taxation than low esteem institutions. However, there would be no 
difference in attitudes between the strong argument/high esteem and strong argument/ low 
esteem conditions. However, for strong arguments there will be no differences between high and 
low esteem institutions.  
For Study 2, a manipulation of cognitive load was introduced to lead participants towards 
processing the argument centrally (no cognitive load) or peripherally (low/high cognitive load). 
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For Study 2, it was hypothesized that institutional esteem will play a role in the formation of the 
participants’ attitudes towards junk food taxation. Specifically, high esteem institutions will 
result in more positive attitudes towards junk food taxation than low esteem institutions. It was 
also hypothesized that those who read a strong argument in favor of junk food taxation will have 
more positive post-manipulation attitudes towards junk food taxation than those who read a weak 
argument. It was also hypothesized that there would be no main effect of cognitive load on 
participants’ attitudes towards junk food taxation. Specifically, participants’ attitudes towards 
junk food taxation would not differ between the no cognitive load, low cognitive load, and high 
cognitive load conditions. The lack of a predicted main effect is due to the effect being qualified 
by higher order interactions. 
 It was also hypothesized that there would be a few interaction effects. Specifically, when 
assessing the interaction between argument strength and institutional esteem, it was hypothesized 
that when an argument is weak, high esteem institutions will result in more positive attitudes 
towards junk food taxation than low esteem institutions. However, there would be no difference 
in attitudes between high and low institutions when the argument is strong. However, for strong 
arguments there will be no differences between high and low esteem institutions. Also, it was 
hypothesized that when an argument is weak, participants under no cognitive load will have 
attitudes towards junk food taxation that are more negative than those under a low or high 
cognitive load. Also, participants under a low cognitive load will have attitudes towards junk 
food taxation that are more negative than participants under a high cognitive load. However, 
when the argument is strong there will be no effect of cognitive load. It was also hypothesized 
that there would be an interaction effect between cognitive load and institutional esteem. 
Specifically, when participants are reading an argument from a high esteem institution, high 
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cognitive loads will result in attitudes that are more positive than low cognitive loads, and low 
cognitive loads will result in attitudes that are more positive than no cognitive load. However, it 
was hypothesized that there would be no differences in attitudes between participants who read 
arguments from low esteem institutions in the no cognitive load condition, low cognitive load 
condition, and high cognitive load conditions.  
It was also hypothesized that there would be a three way interaction effect. Specifically, 
when participants reads an argument from a high esteem institution, and they have a strong 
argument, there will not be significant differences in attitudes between those who were in the no 
cognitive load condition, low cognitive load condition, or high cognitive load condition. 
However, when participants read an argument from a high esteem institution, and they have a 
weak argument, those under no cognitive load will have attitudes towards junk food taxation that 
are more negative than those who were under a low cognitive load, and that those under a low 
cognitive load will have attitudes that are more negative than those who were under a high 
cognitive load. Also, when participants read an argument from a low esteem institution, and they 
have a strong argument, there will not be significant differences in attitudes between those who 
were in the no cognitive load condition, low cognitive load condition, or high cognitive load 
condition. However, when participants read an argument from a low esteem institution, and they 
have a weak argument, those under no cognitive load will have attitudes towards junk food 
taxation that are more negative than those who were under a low cognitive load, and that those 
under a low cognitive load will have attitudes that are more negative than those who were under 
a high cognitive load. However, the attitudes of by participants who read weak arguments from 
high esteem institutions will be more positive than the attitudes of those who read weak 
arguments from low esteem institutions across all cognitive load conditions.  
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Study 1 Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 292 workers (83 males; 76.2% Caucasian; Mage = 39.18, SDage = 12.88) 
on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) who each received $0.25 for participating in the study. 
A description of the present study was posted on Amazon’s MTurk website where potential 
participants were able to click a link to participate in the study. Participants were assigned a 
random ID number so that no personal or identifying information was linked to their individual 
responses.Procedure and Measures 
 All study procedures were approved by the University’s Institutional Review Board. 
Participants first provided informed consent. All measures were completed on a computer by 
online workers for MTurk. Participants first completed the study-specific measure of attitudes 
toward ten contemporary issues. This study-specific 10-item measure of pre-manipulation 
attitudes (Appendix A) asks participants to rate their attitudes towards contemporary issues (such 
as junk food taxation, marriage equality, and marijuana legalization), using a scale of 1 
(completely opposed) to 5 (completely for). This measure was used to determine participants’ 
pre-manipulation attitude toward junk food taxation, the item of interest, while not revealing to 
the participants that this was what was being measured. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the study conditions based on the 
following variables: institution esteem and argument. Institution esteem was manipulated in one 
of two ways: High (one of the top five ranked U.S. universities on the 2014 US News and World 
Report rankings: Columbia University, Harvard University, Princeton University, Stanford 
University, Yale University) or Low (one of the bottom five ranked U.S. universities: Montana 
State University, South Dakota State University, University of Montana, University of Missouri 
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at Kansas City, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). Participants were prompted that they 
would be reading an argument in favor of junk food taxation from one of these ten institutions 
(each participant saw their randomly assigned institution name). The argument for junk food 
taxation was adapted from a previous study (Clark et al., 2008). Argument quality was 
manipulated in one of two ways: Strong (e.g., research summary from a university researcher, 
diabetes statistics, weak framing of statistics) or Weak (e.g., research summary from a university 
research assistant, joint pain statistics, weak framing of statistics). Please see Appendix B for the 
manipulated versions of the argument. 
Following the manipulation, participants were asked to rate their attitudes towards junk 
food taxation (Appendix C). Participants were asked to rate how they perceived junk food 
taxation on scales of 1 (negative, harmful, foolish, undesirable, bad, favorable, unneeded, not 
valuable, possible, not affected) to 9 (positive, beneficial, wise, desirable, good, unfavorable, 
needed, valuable, possible, affected) based in part on previous research (Clark et al., 2008). We 
then assessed attitude certainty by asking participants on a scale of 1 (not at all certain) to 7 
(very certain) the following questions: 1) How certain are you that your attitude is correct?; and 
2) How certain are you in your attitude towards the new policy? Participants were also asked to 
write down up to 10 thoughts that they had while reading the junk food taxation argument 
(responses not analyzed in the present study).  
  Participants then completed a study-specific measure of institutional esteem (Appendix 
D). Participants were asked to rate how prestigious they believed the 10 institutions used in the 
present study were using a scale of 1 (not at all prestigious) to 5 (very prestigious). Internal 
consistency was high for the high (α = .85) and low (α = .92) esteemed institutions. This scale 
was incorporated as a means of checking the manipulation of institutional esteem. It was used to 
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determine whether or not the participants were distinguishing between the esteem of the two 
groups (High and Low).  
 A final manipulation check was used to evaluate the memory of the participants 
(Appendix E). The participants were prompted to write down everything thing that they could 
remember from the argument for junk food taxation. They were then asked to freely recall the 
name of the institution from which the argument was said to have come from. Lastly, they were 
asked to rate the esteem of the institution in the argument. 
 At the end of the study, participants were asked to report basic demographic information. 
They were then debriefed and received the study incentive. 
Data Analysis 
 First, the data were examined to assess for any participants who did not likely attend to 
the study manipulation. Any participant for whom open-ended responses (thought listings, 
argument summary, institution name recall) were not related to the task (for example, blank 
spaces, random sequences of letters) was culled from further analysis. A total of 25 participants 
were removed from further analysis for this reason. Next, total participation times were 
calculated for each participant, and all participants completing the study within three standard 
deviations of the mean. The remaining analyses were conducted on 267 participants (81 males, 
76.3% Caucasian, ages 18-73 [M = 39.40, SD = 12.92]). To examine the study hypotheses, I 
conducted a series of 2 (Institutional Esteem: high vs. low) x 2 (Argument Strength: strong vs. 
weak) ANOVAs on the dependent variables.  
Results 
First, a 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to determine if there were any pre-manipulation 
group differences in attitude toward junk food taxation. There was not a significant difference in 
16 
Institutional Esteem and Attitudes      
 
pre-manipulation attitudes by institutional esteem, F(1,263) = 1.32, p = .25, or by argument type, 
F(1,263) = 1.88, p = .17. The interaction was also not significant, F(1,263) = 1.42, p = .24. 
Means and standard deviations for the study variables are presented in Table 1. 
Next, a series of 2 x 2 ANOVAs were conducted to compare the effect of institution 
esteem and argument strength on post-manipulation attitudes toward junk food taxation. Of note, 
the ten post-manipulation attitudes items were averaged into three composite scores based on 
previous research with these items and results of scale reliability analyses: Items 1-5 (Clark et 
al., 2008), Item 6 (“Junk food taxation is unfavorable/favorable”), and Items 7-10. For clarity, 
Items 1-5 will be referred to as the Clark et al. Scale, and Items 7-10 will be referred to as the 
Junk Food Affect Scale. Internal consistency was high for the first five items (α = .98). For the 
second five items, internal consistency was adequate when Item 6 (favorable/unfavorable) was 
removed from the analysis (α = .69). 
For Items 1-5, the main effect of institutional esteem was not significant, F(1,263) = 0.16, 
p = .69, η2 = .001. However, there was a significant main effect of argument type, F(1,263) = 
8.45, p = .004, η2 = .03, indicating that strong arguments (M = 7.38, SD = 3.17) resulted in more 
positive attitudes towards junk food taxation compared to weak arguments (M = 6.16, SD = 
3.38), independent of institutional esteem. There was not a significant institutional esteem by 
argument type interaction, F (1,263) = 2.63, p = .11, η2 = .01.  
When the participants were asked to rate how much they favor junk food taxation, there 
were no significant main effects of institutional esteem (F(1,263) = 0.05, p = .83, η2 = .00) or  
argument type (F(1,263) = 3.39, p = .07, η2 = .01), or significant interactions between the two 
factors, F(1,263) = 1.16, p = .28, η2 = .004)..  
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Lastly, for Items 7-10, neither the main effect of institutional esteem, F(1,263) = 0.23, p 
= .63, η2 = .001, nor the main effect of argument type, F(1,263) = 1.23, p = .27, η2 = .01, were 
significant. The interaction effect was marginal, F(1,263) = 3.50, p = .06, η2 = .01. For those 
participants reading an argument from a highly esteemed institution, more positive attitudes 
towards junk food taxation were seen following a strong (M = 5.52, SD = 1.94) rather than weak 
(M = 4.79, SD = 2.03) argument, p = .03. No significant differences emerged for those in the low 
esteem condition (p = .61).   
When participants were asked to rate how certain they were that their attitudes toward 
junk food taxation were correct (“How certain are you that your attitude is correct?”), there were 
no significant main effects of institutional esteem: F(1,263) = 0.15, p = .70, η2 = .001; argument 
type: F(1,263) = 0.09, p = .76, η2 = .00 or significant interactions between the two factors, 
F(1,263) = 0.25, p = .62, η2 = .001. There were similarly no significant differences when 
participants were asked to rate how certain they were in their attitudes toward junk food taxation 
(“How certain are you in your attitude towards the new policy?”; ps > .30).  
Secondary Analyses 
Participants were also asked to freely recall the name of the institution the research in the 
junk food taxation argument came from. A 2 (argument strength) × 2 (institutional esteem) 
ANOVA was conducted on if participants remembered the correct institution (coded 0 = 
incorrect and 1 = correct). There was not a significant main effect of institutional esteem, 
F(1,263) = 2.47, p = .12, η2 = .01, or argument type, F(1,263) = 0.00, p = .97, η2 = .00, on correct 
recall of the institution. The interaction was also not significant, F(1,263) = 0.43, p = .51, η2 = 
.00. Of those who remembered the correct institution (83/267), however, there was a significant 
main effect of institutional esteem, F(1,79) = 36.83, p < .001, η2 = .32, but not of argument type 
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(p = .12) or significant interaction (p = .44), on ratings of the esteem of the manipulation 
institution. Specifically, participants rated the esteem of the correctly remembered institution as 
higher in the High esteem group (M = 4.43, SD = 0.61) than in the Low esteem group (M = 3.25, 
SD = 1.11).  
Several significant findings emerged on the institutional esteem scale. All participants 
were asked to rate the esteem of all five High esteem institutions and all five Low esteem 
institutions that were used in the present study. The following analyses were conducted on 
participants’ ratings of the High versus Low esteem institutions on the institutional esteem scale. 
For the High esteem institutions (Columbia, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, Yale), there was a 
significant institutional esteem by argument type interaction, F(1,244) = 5.39, p = .02, η2 = .02; 
however, none of the pairwise comparisons were statistically significant (ps > .07). For the Low 
esteem institutions (Montana State, South Dakota State, Missouri-Kansas City, Montana, North 
Carolina-Charlotte), there was a significant main effect of argument type, F(1,244) = 5.40, p = 
.02, η2 = .02. Those in the weak argument condition (M = 2.77, SD = 0.90) rated the esteem of 
the Low esteem institutions as higher than those in the strong argument condition (M = 2.52, SD 
= 0.75).  
Discussion 
 The findings seem to support the study hypotheses that strong arguments would result in 
the participants having more positive attitudes towards junk food taxation than weak arguments. 
The only significant difference to emerge on the post-manipulation attitudes scales was a main 
effect of argument strength for Items 1-5 (negative/positive, harmful/beneficial, foolish/wise, 
undesirable/desirable, bad/good). This finding shows that the manipulation was reliable in 
presenting an argument that was either persuasive (strong) or not (weak). There more persuasive 
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the argument, the more likely that there were positive attitudes toward junk food taxation. This 
finding is consistent with previous research suggesting that strong arguments are more 
persuasive than weak arguments when individuals are centrally processing the message in those 
studies (Clark et al., 2008; Lee, 2012). It may be that there was no significant effect of 
institutional esteem on the post-manipulation attitudes of the participants because they were 
processing the information centrally, elaborating on the arguments and the presented 
information. It is possible that manipulating the route of information processing through the 
introduction of a cognitive load manipulation might alter how accurately participants perceive 
the argument quality and use the argument to inform their attitudes toward junk food taxation. It 
is possible that overwhelming participants’ cognitive abilities while reading the manipulation 
will result in greater peripheral processing, in turn leading to a reliance on institutional esteem in 
the formation of their attitudes. 
 The finding that participants rated the esteem of the correctly remembered institution as 
higher in the High esteem group than in the Low esteem group showed that the manipulation of 
institutional esteem was successful in this study. Although institutional esteem did not affect 
correct recall of the involved institution, participants who did recall the correct institution 
accurately perceived the esteem of the institution in a way that is predictable within the 
operational definition of institutional esteem used in the present study. This finding indicates that 
the two groups are being perceived as separate and distinguishable on a scale of esteem, lending 
credibility to the notion that institutional esteem may be used as a heuristic cue when the 
peripheral route to information processing is taken if participants are not capable of elaboration 
during processing. 
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In Study 2, the introduction of the cognitive load manipulation was implemented to 
assess for the possibility that the name of the institution name may be used as a peripheral cue 
when reading the argument and forming their attitude toward junk food taxation. I hypothesized 
individuals that are in the high cognitive load conditions will be more likely to use the name of 
the institution to form their attitudes  Specifically, those in the no cognitive load/strong argument 
condition will have post-manipulation attitudes towards junk food taxation that are more positive 
compared to those in the low cognitive load/weak argument condition, and that those in  the low 
cognitive load/weak argument condition will have post-manipulation attitudes towards junk food 
taxation that are more positive compared to the no cognitive load/weak argument condition; 
these results should also be independent of institutional esteem. Also, participants in the high 
cognitive load/weak argument and the high cognitive load/strong argument conditions will have 
post-manipulation attitudes towards junk food taxation that are more positive when attributed to 
a high rather than low esteem institution.  
Study 2 Method 
Participants 
Participants were 218 undergraduate students (92 males; 71.6% Caucasian; Mage =18.93, 
SDage =2.91) at a regional campus of a large Midwestern university who received course or extra 
credit for involvement in the study.   
Procedure 
 All study procedures were approved by the University’s Institutional Review Board. 
Participants first provided informed consent. All measures were completed on a computer. 
Participants first completed the study-specific measure of attitudes toward ten contemporary 
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issues (Appendix A), followed by random assignment to one of the study conditions based on the 
following variables: cognitive load, institutional esteem, and argument.  
 Participants were prompted that they would be reading an argument in favor of junk food 
taxation from one of these ten institutions (each participant saw their randomly assigned 
institution name). The same junk food taxation argument described in Study 1 was utilized in 
Study 2 (Appendix B). Both argument strength (Strong, Weak) and institutional esteem (High, 
Low) were manipulated the same way in Study 2 as they were in Study 1. A third manipulation 
also occurred: cognitive load. While reading the argument in favor of junk food taxation, 
participants were also asked to: 1) pay attention to a series of letters presented via an audio file 
and count the number of vowels heard (High); or 2) ignore a series of letters presented via an 
audio file (Low). In the third manipulation, no auditory information was presented (None). 
Participants in all conditions wore headphones during the study. Institutional esteem (high, low) 
and argument strength (strong, weak) were manipulated as in Study 1.  
Following the manipulation, those in the high cognitive load condition were asked to 
specify how many vowels they had heard as a means of assessing whether or not they had 
followed the instructions to count vowels while reading the argument (Appendix F). Participants 
in all cognitive load conditions also completed the distraction measure indicating on a scale of 1 
(not at all distracted) to 7 (very distracted) they felt while reading the argument (Appendix F). 
This was used to assess whether those in the high cognitive load condition were actually more 
distracted than those in the low cognitive load condition, and if those in the low cognitive load 
condition were more distracted than those in the no cognitive load condition.. 
Following the manipulation, participants were asked to rate their attitudes towards junk 
food taxation (Appendix C). The same ten questions were utilized from Study 1. In addition, 
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attitude certainty was again assessed with the two items from Study 1 (Appendix C). Participants 
were also asked to write down up to 10 thoughts that they had while reading the junk food 
taxation argument (responses not analyzed in the present study).  
 A study-specific measure of institutional esteem was included (Appendix D). Participants 
were asked to rate how prestigious they believed the 10 institutions used in the present study 
were using a scale of 1 (not at all prestigious) to 5 (very prestigious). Internal consistency was 
high for the high (α = .85) and low (α = .92) esteemed institutions. This scale was incorporated 
as a means of checking the manipulation of institutional esteem. It was used to determine 
whether or not the participants were distinguishing between the esteem of the two groups (High 
and Low).  
 A final manipulation check was used to evaluate the memory of the participants 
(Appendix E). The participants were prompted to write down everything thing that they could 
remember from the argument for junk food taxation. They were then asked to freely recall the 
name of the institution from which the argument was said to have come from. Lastly, they were 
asked to rate the esteem of the institution in the article. 
 At the end of the study, participants were asked to report basic demographic information. 
 After the study the participants were debriefed and received the study incentive. 
Data Analysis 
 First, data were examined to assess for any participants who did not likely attend to the 
study manipulation. Any participant for whom open-ended responses (thought listings, argument 
summary, institution name recall) were not related to the task (for example, blank spaces, 
random sequences of letters) was culled from further analysis. Five participants were removed 
from further analysis for this reason. No participants were removed due to significantly fast or 
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slow study completion times. The remaining analyses were conducted on 213 participants (90 
males, 71.9% Caucasian, ages 18-49 [M = 18.95, SD = 2.94]). To assess the study hypotheses, a 
series of 3 (Cognitive Load: High vs. Low vs. None) × 2 (Institutional Esteem: High vs. Low) × 
2 (Argument Strength: Strong vs. Weak) ANOVAs were conducted on the dependent variables.  
Results 
First, I conducted a 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA to determine if there were any pre-manipulation 
group differences in attitude toward junk food taxation. There was not a significant difference in 
pre-manipulation attitudes based on institutional esteem, F(1,212) = 0.84, p = .36, argument 
type, F(1,212) = 2.25, p = .14, or cognitive load, F(1,212) = 0.55, p = .58.  None of the two-way 
interactions were significant (ps > .25) and the three-way interaction also showed no group 
differences, F(1,212) = 2.18, p = .12.  
To assess whether the cognitive load manipulation worked, we examined the distribution 
of responses (number of vowels heard) in the high cognitive load condition. Two responses were 
extreme scores (72, 500) in the context of the correct answer (10) and were removed from the 
calculation of the mean and median. In general responses were clustered around the correct 
answer (M = 9.36, median = 9.00, mode = 10.00, SD = 4.70). There was a significant main effect 
of cognitive load on levels of self-reported distraction during the manipulation, F(2,200) = 71.10, 
p < .001, η2 = .42. The participants in the high cognitive load condition (M = 6.12, SD = 1.43) 
reported significantly higher distraction than participants in the low cognitive load condition (M 
= 5.27, SD = 1.45) and in the no cognitive load condition (M = 3.03, SD = 1.82), ps ≤ .001. 
Participants in the low cognitive load condition reported higher distraction that participants in the 
no cognitive load condition, p < .001. 
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Next, a series of 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs were conducted to compare the effects of 
institutional esteem, argument strength, and cognitive load on post-manipulation attitude toward 
junk food taxation. Of note, the ten post-manipulation attitudes items were again summed into 
three composite scores based on previous research (Clark et al., 2008) Internal consistency was 
high for the first five items (α = .98). For the second five items, internal consistency was 
adequate when Item 6 (favorable/unfavorable) was removed from the analysis (α = .69). For the 
Clark et al. Scale (negative/positive, harmful/beneficial, foolish/wise, undesirable/desirable, 
bad/good), none of the main effects were significant (ps > .41). In addition, none of the two-way 
or three-way interactions were significant (ps > .16).  
Lastly, for Junk Food Affect Scale (unneeded/needed, not valuable/valuable, possible/not 
possible, not affected/affected), the main effects of institutional esteem, F(1,212) = 0.70, p = .40, 
η2 = .00, argument type, F(1,212) = 0.96, p = .33, η2 = .01, and cognitive load, F(1,212) = 1.30, p 
= .28, η2 = .01, were not significant. The two- and three-way interactions were also not 
significant (ps > .58).  
When instead asked how certain they were that their attitude toward junk food taxation was 
correct, there were no significant main effects of institutional esteem: F(1,212) = 1.86, p = .17, 
η2 = .01; argument type: F(1,212) = 0.87, p = .35, η2 = .004; or cognitive load: F(1,212) = 2.36, p 
= .10, η2 = .02. There were also no significant interactions (ps > .26). There were similarly no 
significant differences when participants were asked to rate their certainty in their attitudes 
toward junk food taxation (ps > .26). Secondary Analyses 
Participants were also asked to freely recall the name of the institution the research 
summary came from. There was a significant main effect of institutional esteem, F(1,212) = 
11.98, p = .001, η2 = .06, indicating participants correctly recalled high esteem institutions (M = 
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0.55, SD = 0.50) more often than low esteem institutions (M = 0.32, SD = 0.47). However, there 
was not a significant main effect of argument type, F(1,212) = 0.05, p = .83, η2 = .00, or 
cognitive load, F(1,212) = 0.61, p = .55, η2 = .01, on correct recall of the institution. The 
interaction effects were also not significant (ps > .41).  
Of those who remembered the correct institution, there was a significant main effect of 
institutional esteem, F(1,79) = 12.77, p < .001, η2 = .14, but not of argument type, F(1,79) = 1.58, 
p = .21, η2 = .02), or cognitive load, F(2,79) = 0.72, p = .49, η2 = .02, on ratings of the esteem of 
the remembered institution. Specifically, participants who rated the esteem of the correctly 
remembered institution as of higher esteem in the High esteem group (M = 3.85, SD = 1.04) than 
in the Low esteem group (M = 3.21, SD = 1.02), p = .001.  
Several significant interactions also occurred. There was a significant interaction between 
institutional esteem and argument strength, F(1,79) = 4.47, p = .03, η2 = .05. Specifically, for 
those who read a strong argument, High esteem institutions (M = 4.35, SD = 0.80) were rated 
higher than Low esteem institutions (M = 3.18, SD = 1.19), p < .001. There were no differences 
in esteem ratings for those who read a weak argument, p = .29. There was also an interaction 
between institutional esteem and cognitive load, F(2,79) = 4.35, p = .02, η2 = .10. Specifically, 
those in the high cognitive load (p = .006) and no cognitive load (p < .001) conditions rated High 
esteem institutions (high: M = 4.30, SD = 0.82; none: M = 4.41, SD = 0.87) as higher in esteem 
than Low esteem institutions (high: M = 3.47, SD = 0.80; none: M = 3.10, SD = 1.45). There 
were no differences in esteem ratings for those in the low cognitive load condition, p = .79. 
There was also a significant interaction between argument strength and cognitive load, F(2,79) = 
3.86, p = .03, η2 = .09. Specifically, within the no cognitive load condition, weak argument (M = 
4.21, SD = 1.00) were rated as more esteemed than those that were paired with strong arguments 
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(M = 3.62, SD = 1.56), p = .005. No differences emerged between those in the high (p = .55) or 
low (p = .79) conditions. The three-way interaction was marginal, F(2,79) = 2.73, p = .07, η2 = 
.07.  
Discussion 
 
 None of the results supported the hypothesis that a cognitive load manipulation would 
alter how individuals processed information—from centrally to more peripherally—leading to 
differences in attitudes toward junk food taxation based on the esteem of the institution named in 
the article and the strength of the argument. The results indicated that cognitive load, when 
paired with institutional esteem and argument strength, not only had no effect on the formation 
of an attitude toward junk food taxation, it also had no effect on the confidence of the 
participants in their reported attitudes. Previous researchers found that taxing the cognitive load 
of participants leads to a difference in the formation of attitudes; however, the present study 
failed to replicate such findings (Pohl et al, 2013; Jones et al., 2006). These previous studies used 
tactics such as restricting the letters that participants could respond with and having them 
remember a number while preforming a task, and we used a recording of spoken letters that 
participants had to monitor to count vowels. It is possible that our cognitive load manipulation 
was not as strong as in the previous studies. Although in the present study our cognitive load 
manipulation worked—participants rated their level of distraction as highest in the high cognitive 
load condition, followed by the low and no cognitive load conditions—it had no effect on 
participants’ attitudes towards junk food taxation.  
 The results of Study 2 indicate that participants were more likely to recall the names of 
High esteem institutions than Low esteem institutions. It is possible that participants may have 
been able to remember the institution name because it was a kind of peripheral cue, but perhaps 
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it was not used in the way that I hypothesized. For example, the peripheral cue of the 
institutional esteem may not have affected the attitudes of the participants, but perhaps affected 
how well the participants remember the presented information; being more likely to remember 
the institution could indicate that they are more likely to remember other points in the argument. 
Closer analysis of manipulation checks may be needed. Specifically, closer analysis will be 
needed to look at when participants were prompted to recall everything that they remembered 
from the argument.  
 The fact that participants rated institutions in the High esteem group as higher than those 
in the Low esteem group shows that the institutional esteem manipulation was successful, even 
with the introduction of the cognitive load manipulation. The finding that participants in the 
High cognitive load and No cognitive load conditions rated High esteem institutions as higher in 
esteem than Low esteem institutions shows that institutional esteem is being perceived in both 
the presence and absence of a secondary cognitive task. Although this pattern of institutional 
esteem perception was not present in the Low cognitive load condition, it is possible that with 
more participants a similar pattern would emerge.  
 The finding that in the absence of a cognitive load manipulation, institutions paired with 
weak arguments were rated as more esteemed than those paired with strong arguments seems to 
contradict what was expected. Further research may be necessary to understand why such an 
interaction may occur. 
General Discussion 
 The present series of studies sought to examine if institutional esteem is utilized as a 
peripheral cue when judgments are made about the quality of academic research. Specifically, I 
hypothesized that if an individual was under a high cognitive load, they would be more likely to 
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use the name of the institution as a peripheral cue when forming their attitude rather than the 
quality of the argument. The results showed limited support for such a bias in the perception of 
research quality and the formation of attitudes towards a topic. Institutional esteem did not affect 
participants’ attitude towards the topic in either study. Therefore, the current studies provide 
limited evidence supporting the idea that the peripheral route of processing, combined with an 
argument from a high esteem institution, result in more favorable views of research compared to 
attitudes that are formed under a high cognitive load and an argument paired with a low esteem 
institution. Although few significant findings emerged across the studies, results in Study 1 
(main effect of argument strength on attitude formation; main effect of institution esteem on 
remembered institution name) and Study 2 (main effect of cognitive load on distraction as a 
manipulation check; main and interaction effects of institution esteem on remembered institution 
name) indicated that the manipulations themselves were successful. Thus it is possible that 
institutional esteem does not work as a peripheral cue, but it is also possible that the dependent 
variable utilized were not sensitive to its effects. 
 One finding that did emerge across studies was a difference in institution esteem rating 
based on exposure to a high or low institution in the study manipulation. This relationship shows 
that the participants are distinguishing the two groups in a way that divides them on an esteem 
scale. The fact that the participants are distinguishing between the two groups of institutions 
lends to the idea that institutional esteem is something that might be used as a peripheral cue. 
Getting these two finding across the studies suggests the manipulation was successful, but it 
seemed like this was only the case for those who could accurately recall the institutions. 
However, future research may be needed to figure how institutional esteem affects the attitudes 
of individuals whom may use it as a peripheral cue. 
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Limitations 
 There are a few possible reasons that that the present results did not show any consistent, 
significant relationship between cognitive load and attitude formation. It is possible that the 
cognitive load manipulation did not affect the participants the way that we hypothesized. 
Although participants reported increased distraction with increased cognitive load, this 
distraction did not appear to lead to the use of the institutional esteem as a peripheral cue. 
Perhaps the letter listening task was not enough to distract individuals while they read the 
argument for junk food taxation. It may also be that institutional esteem is not something that is 
used as a peripheral cue or heuristic when they are judging the quality of academic research; 
however, for this conclusion to be reached, additional information is needed. Specifically, we 
would need to know that the participants were actually processing peripherally in the appropriate 
conditions. We may have to take a closer look at the memory check that was implemented after 
the manipulation, and see if there is a pattern in the way that they are remembering and thinking 
about the information. 
 It is also possible that the name of the institution was not named in the argument enough. 
The participants saw the name of the institution in a prompt before the argument, and then again 
in the argument. It is possible that if the institution was named more times in the argument, then 
there would have been more participants that remembered the name of the institution. 
 It may even be possible that the dependent variables used in this study were not sensitive 
to the effects of institutional esteem as a peripheral cue. Perhaps a peripheral cue like 
institutional esteem is not an influential factor when an individual is forming an attitude towards 
a topic like public policy or junk food taxation. Perhaps if the topic were more in line with a 
subject that is perceived as a more academic or research specific issue (i.e. mental health issues, 
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medical diagnoses), then an academic research institution would be seen as more of an authority 
and used as a cue for attitude formation. 
 It is also possible that there was a fundamental difference between the two populations of 
the studies. Because the two groups differed significantly in age, it is possible that they have 
differing opinions on the topic of junk food taxation. The average age of participants in Study 1 
was 39.40, indicating that the majority of these individuals are likely to be in the workforce and 
aware of public policies, as well as the taxes that they are paying. However, the mean age of 
participants in Study 2 was 18.93. Because these participants were, on average, much younger 
and still in college, it is possible that the topics of public policies and junk food taxation is not as 
important to them. It is also possible that educational background (such as completion of a 
college degree versus college degree still in progress) may have affected understanding and 
interpretation of the junk food taxation argument. This may explain why the argument strength 
failed to have an effect in Study 2. However, the finding that individuals are more likely to 
remember the names of high esteem institutions than low esteemed institutions suggests that 
there may be a kind of brand recognition effect when it comes to recognizing high esteem 
institutions. Perhaps they are more recognizable, and they come to mind more readily when 
individuals think about academic institutions.  
Future Research 
 Future research should look into how familiarity with an institution affects the way that 
individuals respond to arguments or research that come from familiar institutions. It is possible 
that mere exposure to an institution may result in higher opinions of the institution. Familiarity 
may act in a similar way as institutional esteem, especially since one would have to be familiar 
with an institution to know if it is considered highly esteemed in the first place.  
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 There may also be a relationship between how individuals process information and how 
they perceive institutional esteem that is opposite of what the present study sought to find. That 
is, it is possible that by reading a weak argument from a high esteem institution the perceived 
esteem of the institution may be negatively impacted.  Future research should examine if the 
perceived esteem of an institution affect how individuals process the strength of an argument, 
and if a cognitive load manipulation plays a role in this relationship.  
 It is possible that institutional esteem may affect more than perceptions of research 
quality. It is possible that individuals who have obtained a degree from a more esteemed 
institution may have a leg-up when it comes to finding a career. Perhaps by controlling for 
résumé quality, and providing many résumés for participants to look choose someone to “hire,” a 
bias may emerge in favor of those who have degrees from high esteem institutions. Future 
research may be able to implement résumé studies to assess the possibility of an implicit bias 
towards job applicants with degrees from highly esteemed institutions.  
 Given the present results, several changes are suggested for future research on 
institutional esteem as a peripheral cue. For example, making the argument shorter, with less 
complex arguments, would allow for the name of the institution to be included more than once. 
This repetition might increase the saliency of the peripheral cue to form attitudes towards the 
topic. It is possible that more exposure to the name of the institution would have resulted in more 
participants remembering the institution correctly. Also, the use a different cognitive load 
manipulation may have yielded better results. Although participants in the low and high 
cognitive load conditions reported being more distracted than those in the no cognitive load 
condition, it is possible that another cognitive load manipulation, perhaps having the participants 
remember a number or limit the amount of time that they have to read the argument, would have 
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been more effective in distracting the participants from elaborating on the information that was 
presented to them.  
Conclusions 
 In conclusion, across two studies I found limited evidence in favor of institutional esteem 
being utilized as a peripheral cue when reading research-related information. However, this may 
be due to how attitudes were assessed in the present study. It may be that institutional esteem, as 
a peripheral cue, did not affect the variables that were measured in the current studies. Future 
research is needed to gain an understanding of the ways in which individuals use the name of an 
institution as a peripheral cue to make decisions, process information, remember information, or 
form attitudes towards a topic.  
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Table 1 
Study variables presented as Mean (Standard Deviation). 
 
Study 1 
Variable S,H S,L W,H W,L 
Pre-attitude 4.09(1.04) 4.08 (1.06) 3.75(1.21) 4.06(0.97) 
Post-attitude 
1-5 
7.59(3.21) 7.09 (3.12) 5.77(3.45) 6.58(3.28) 
Post-attitude 
6 
4.63(3.12) 5.12 (3.01) 5.72(2.95) 5.41(3.08) 
Post-attitude 
7-10 
5.52(1.94) 5.18 (2.27) 4.79(2.03) 5.37(1.69) 
Post-attitude 
certainty 1 
5.79(1.33) 5.64 (1.63) 5.65(1.39) 5.67(1.23) 
Post-attitude 
certainty 2 
5.87(1.33) 5.74 (1.47) 5.70(1.42) 5.91(1.16) 
Esteem-high 4.65(0.42) 4.49 (0.77) 4.49(0.60) 4.67(0.47) 
Esteem-low 2.49(0.69) 2.56 (0.82) 2.70(0.96) 2.84(0.83) 
Distraction -- -- -- -- 
 
Note: S,H = Strong argument, High institution esteem group; S,L = Strong argument, Low 
institutional esteem group; W,H = Weak argument, High institutional esteem group; W, L = 
Weak argument, Low institutional esteem group; S,H,N = Strong argument, High institution 
esteem, No cognitive load group; S,H,L = Strong argument, High institution esteem, Low 
cognitive load group; S,H,H = Strong argument, High institution esteem, High cognitive load 
group S,L,N = Strong argument, Low institutional esteem, No cognitive load group; S,L,L = 
Strong argument, Low institutional esteem, Low cognitive load group; S,L,H = Strong argument, 
Low institutional esteem, High cognitive load group; Pre-attitude = Measure of pre-manipulation 
attitudes; Post-attitude 1-5 = Post manipulation measure of attitudes toward junk food taxation 
(negative/positive, harmful/beneficial, foolish/wise, undesirable/desirable, bad/good); Post-
attitude 6 = Post manipulation measure of attitudes toward junk food taxation 
(favorable/unfavorable); Post-attitude 7-10 = (unneeded/needed, not valuable/valuable, 
impossible/possible, not affected/affected); Post-attitude certainty 1 = How certain are you that 
your attitude is correct?; Post-attitude certainty 2 = How certain are you in your attitude towards 
the new policy?; Esteem-high = Institutional Esteem Scale (High esteem institutions); Esteem-
low = Institutional Esteem Scale (Low Esteem Institutions); Distraction = Measure of 
Distraction. 
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Table 1 continued. 
 
Study 2 
Variable S,H,N S,H,L S,H,H S,L,N S,L,L S,L,H 
Pre-attitude 3.73(1.03) 4.20(0.63) 4.14(0.79) 4.13(1.15) 4.29(0.90) 3.73(1.08) 
Post-attitude 
1-5 
7.10(2.81) 7.28(2.50) 7.31(2.77) 7.89(2.08) 8.45(1.83) 7.26(2.38) 
Post-attitude 6 5.20(2.91) 4.00(2.62) 4.71(2.74) 4.38(2.25) 4.48(2.27) 5.09(2.62) 
Post-attitude 
7-10 
5.38(1.54) 5.35(1.69) 4.92(1.66) 5.52(1.18) 4.88(1.24) 4.95(1.73) 
Post-attitude 
certainty 1 
5.40(1.45) 4.80(1.48) 5.14(1.85) 5.19(2.26) 5.23(1.16) 4.91(1.57) 
Post-attitude 
certainty 2 
5.53(1.46) 5.20(1.48) 5.24(1.76) 2.13(1.50) 4.95(1.36) 5.18(1.56) 
Esteem-high 4.64(0.42) 4.26(0.85) 4.69(0.30) 4.56(0.50) 4.68(0.38) 4.61(0.35) 
Esteem-low 2.85(0.63) 2.50(0.46) 2.72(0.57) 2.81(0.65) 2.76(0.53) 2.71(0.80) 
Distraction 2.67(1.54) 4.90(1.45) 6.00(1.64) 3.19(2.07) 5.05(1.80) 6.24(1.14) 
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Table 1 continued. 
 
 Study 2 
Variable W,H,N W,H,L W,H,H W,L,N W,L,L W,L,H 
Pre-attitude 4.50(0.63) 4.41(0.62) 4.14(0.79) 4.24(0.75) 3.89(1.10) 4.17(0.99) 
Post-
attitude 1-5 
8.31(1.93) 7.81(2.14) 6.99(1.99) 7.78(2.13) 7.16(2.80) 7.82(2.11) 
Post-
attitude 6 
3.88(2.36) 4.82(2.40) 5.33(2.20) 4.94(2.59) 5.05(2.61) 4.33(2.17) 
Post-
attitude 7-
10 
5.64(1.51) 5.63(1.29) 5.26(1.44) 5.46(1.73) 5.09(1.59) 5.19(1.89) 
Post-
attitude 
certainty 1 
4.94(1.39) 4.76(1.52) 4.29(1.90) 5.71(1.16) 5.32(1.25) 4.61(1.72) 
Post-
attitude 
certainty 2 
5.00(1.63) 4.94(1.39) 4.62(1.66) 5.24(1.39) 5.21(1.62) 4.83(1.42) 
Esteem-
high 
4.69(0.26) 4.45(0.40) 4.60(0.33) 4.65(0.67) 4.60(0.33) 4.68(0.35) 
Esteem-low 2.55(0.68) 2.82(0.59) 2.55(0.62) 3.07(0.57) 2.73(0.59) 2.99(0.51) 
Distraction 3.31(1.70) 5.24(0.97) 5.86(1.53) 2.94(2.01) 5.74(1.37) 6.44(1.04) 
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Appendix A 
Measure of pre-manipulation attitudes 
You will now be asked to rate your attitude toward a series of contemporary issues. After rating 
your attitude toward these issues, you will be asked to read and evaluate an argument for or 
against one of these issues. Please indicate your personal position on each issue using this scale. 
 
[1] I am completely opposed to this 
[2] I am somewhat opposed to this 
[3] I am unconcerned with this issue 
[4] I am somewhat for this 
[5] I am completely for this 
 
1) Junk Food Taxation 
2) More gun control 
3) More punishment for bullies 
4) Gay marriage equality 
5) Prayer in schools 
6) Immigration rights 
7) Birth control  
8) Capital punishment 
9) Health care reform 
10) Legalization of marijuana 
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Appendix B 
Strong argument for junk food taxation 
Some states are considering legislation on the taxing of junk food. When taking many factors 
into consideration, this program seems likely to bring about a number of good things. According 
to some proponents of this legislation, taxing junk food will provide money for many 
government-based initiatives. For example, they estimate that a one-cent tax per 12-ounce soft 
drink could generate about $1.5 billion annually which could be spent on promoting physical 
activity and nutrition education. In addition, a penny tax per pound of candy would raise about 
$70 million. Large amounts of money like this could be used to fund a number of healthy 
lifestyle programs and to subsidize health insurance for people suffering from obesity. Also, 
most experts predict that these small taxes would have little or no direct effect on sales of these 
foods. Therefore, employees of junk food producing companies should not be financially 
affected by this tax legislation. In addition to the economic benefits, placing a tax on junk food 
will encourage healthy eating. According to Keith Brown, a researcher at Montana State 
University, a major reason people eat junk food is because it is cheap and convenient. Dr. Brown 
says that so much cheap junk food creates a “toxic environment” of sweetened food. This junk 
food is more calorically dense than healthy food, making people who eat it gain weight. Taxing 
junk food could make people choose healthier alternatives because the healthier food would be 
significantly cheaper than junk food. Dr. Brown proposes to tax junk food to make unhealthy 
food more expensive and to use the funds from the tax to decrease the costs of healthy food by 
70%. By taking the pressure off of individuals to choose between food quality and food value, 
people will feel more positive towards buying and eating healthier food. By promoting healthy 
eating habits, this taxation would also have an indirect impact on the nation’s obesity problem 
(and medical conditions related to obesity).  In another study Dr. Brown reports that in 2001, 
44.3 million Americans were obese and the number of Americans with diabetes increased 61% 
since 1990. The same study found that Americans receive nearly one-third of their calories from 
junk food. These facts are even more alarming when one realizes that diseases like diabetes cost 
millions of dollars annually in health care and lost productivity. In a 2012 study that assessed the 
direct costs of treating diabetes in the U.S., other researchers at Montana State found that the 
estimated total expenditure for 1 year was $45.2 billion. Because eating large amounts of junk 
food is associated with being obese and is related to a higher risk for costly diseases like 
diabetes, junk food is a major contributor to the current obesity problem. 
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Weak argument for junk food taxation 
Some states are considering legislation on the taxing of junk food. When taking many factors 
into consideration, this program seems likely to bring about a number of good things. According 
to some proponents of this legislation, taxing junk food will provide money for many 
government-based initiatives. For example, they estimate that a one-cent tax per 12-ounce soft 
drink could generate a small amount of money annually which could be spent on a number of 
different things. In addition, a penny tax per pound of candy could create a small increase in 
funds as well. Amounts of money like this could be used to partially fund programs for a small 
number of citizens. Also, most experts predict that these small taxes would have a significant 
effect on sales of these foods. This decrease in sales would have an adverse financial effect on 
some junk food company employees (approximately 40%-60%). Therefore, most of the money 
acquired via this tax, would need to be spent toward unemployment funds and other government 
services for these employees. In addition to the economic benefits, placing a tax on junk food 
might encourage healthy eating. According to Keith Brown, an undergraduate research assistant 
at Montana State University, a major reason people eat junk food is because it is cheap and 
convenient. Brown says that so much cheap junk food creates a “toxic environment” of 
sweetened food. This junk food is somewhat more calorically dense than healthy food, making 
people who eat it gain weight. Taxing junk food could make people choose healthier alternatives 
because the healthier food would be only slightly more expensive than junk food. Brown 
proposes to tax junk food in order to negatively affect junk food producers and in turn, decrease 
the large amount of junk food that has become too readily available for consumers. By taking the 
pressure off of individuals to choose between food quality and food value, people will feel more 
positive towards buying and eating healthier food. By promoting healthy eating habits, this 
taxation may also have an indirect impact on the nation’s obesity problem (and medical 
conditions related to obesity). Another study that Keith has assisted in reported that in 2001, 15.3 
million Americans were obese and the number of Americans with joint pain increased 2% since 
1990. The same study found that Americans receive nearly one-twelfth of their calories from 
junk food. These facts are even more alarming when one realizes that conditions such as joint 
pain cost thousands of dollars annually in health care and lost productivity. In a 2012 survey that 
assessed the indirect costs of treating sufferers of joint pain, other researchers at Montana State 
found that the estimated total expenditure for 1 year was $100,000. Because eating large amounts 
of junk food is associated with being obese and is related to a higher risk for costly medical 
conditions like joint pain, junk food is a major contributor to the current obesity problem. 
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Appendix C 
Post manipulation measure of attitudes toward junk food taxation 
1) Junk food taxation is... 
 Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Positive 
2) Junk food taxation is... 
 Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Beneficial 
3) Junk food taxation is... 
 Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Wise 
4) Junk food taxation is... 
 Undesirable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Desirable 
5) Junk food taxation is... 
 Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Good 
6) Please rate how much you favor junk food taxation: 
Favorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unfavorable 
7) Please rate to what extent you think junk food taxation is needed: 
Unneeded 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Needed 
8) Please rate to what extent you think junk food taxation would be valuable: 
Not valuable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Valuable 
9) Please rate to what extent you think junk food taxation is possible: 
Impossible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Possible 
10) To what degree will the plan (to tax junk food) affect you personally? 
Not affected 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Affected 
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How certain are you that your attitude is correct?  
 Not at all certain  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain 
 
 
How certain are you in your attitude towards the new policy?  
 
 Not at all certain  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very certain 
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Appendix D 
Institutional esteem scale 
 
Using the scales provided, please indicate how prestigious you believe each of the following 
universities to be. 
 
[1] Not at all prestigious 
[2] Not very prestigious 
[3] Average  
[4] Somewhat prestigious 
[5] Very prestigious 
 
1) Columbia University 
2) Harvard University 
3) Montana State University 
4) Princeton University 
5) South Dakota State University 
6) Stanford University 
7) The University of Missouri at Kansas City 
8) The University of Montana 
9) The University of North Carolina at Charlotte 
10) Yale University 
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Appendix E 
Manipulation check questions 
 
Please write down everything you remember from the passage you read regarding the proposed 
junk food taxation policy:  
 
 
 
 
 
The research that was discussed in the passage you read came from what University?  
 
 
How would you rate the esteem of the University that the research came from in the passage?  
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
 Low esteem      High esteem 
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Appendix F 
Measure of distraction 
How many vowels did you count? 
 
 
How distracted did you feel while reading the passage?  
Not at all distracted 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Very distracted 
